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Summary
As part of his response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York
City and Washington, DC, President George W. Bush announced in his September
20 address to a joint session of Congress that he was creating, within the White
House Office, an Office of Homeland Security (OHS), headed by a director who
would have Cabinet rank and would report directly to the President.  OHS, as
subsequently chartered with E.O. 13228 of October 8, 2001, is an agency of the
Executive Office of the President.  The success of this office as a coordinator of a
comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the nation against terrorism may be
guided by past experience with similar such entities.  This report reviews past
experience—principally with the Office of War Mobilization and its successor, the
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion—and its possible significance for
OHS, as well as the administrative development of the new agency; it will be updated
as events recommend.
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Homeland Security: 
The Presidential Coordination Office
In his September 20, 2001, address to a joint session of Congress, President
George W. Bush announced that, as part of his response to the September 11 terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in
Washington, DC, he was creating an Office of Homeland Security (OHS).
According to the President’s initial description of OHS, it was to be located within
the White House Office and would be headed by a director who would have Cabinet
rank and would report directly to the President.  Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge
was named as the President’s choice for director.  His mission and that of his office
would be, in the President’s words, to “lead, oversee, and coordinate a
comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism and
respond to any attacks that may come.”1
Following the announcement by President Bush, few details were forthcoming
regarding OHS.  Because the President historically has enjoyed virtually complete
authority over the organization of the White House Office, no directive or charter for
OHS was publicly released, although this omission contributed to a lack of specificity
regarding the office’s duties.2
A Presidential Charter
On October 8, 2001, President Bush issued E.O. 13228 establishing OHS as an
agency within the Executive Office of the President, which includes such other
agencies as the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the White House Office.3  Later in the day,
Tom Ridge was appointed the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.  The
President’s directive specifies that the head of OHS is the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security, signifying that the individual directing OHS is a member of
the White House Office staff.  The Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, Condoleezza Rice, has a similar status: she is a member of the White House
Office staff and directs the staff of the National Security Council.  Because the
direction of OHS is vested in a presidential assistant, no Senate approval of the Ridge
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appointment was necessary, because all White House Office staff are appointed
without Senate confirmation.  However, this situation and the advisory role that
senior White House officials play may  limit congressional access to such presidential
aides.  Traditionally, they have come before congressional committees only to
explain very serious allegations of personal misconduct. Otherwise, attempts by
congressional overseers and investigators to require their appearance and testimony
before committees has usually been met by presidential invocations of so-called
executive privilege—the privilege of the President to exercise a discretion, based
upon the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, regarding the questioning of
his advisers.4  Also, because OHS has been established by a presidential directive, its
mission, responsibilities, and administration may be readily modified through the
issuance of additional executive orders, a situation that has contributed to
congressional reluctance to appropriate significant amounts of money for an agency
so established for any length of time before requiring a statutory charter.5
Furthermore, because it has a presidential mandate and its leader is a member of the
White House Office staff, OHS may be funded, in large or small part, from
discretionary monies available to the President or amounts from the White House
Office budget, with the result that congressional overseers and appropriators may
have difficulty determining the adequacy of the OHS budget.  These conditions
seemingly militate against the ability of Congress to assess the success of OHS as a
coordinator of a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the nation against
terrorism.
E.O. 13228 also established the Homeland Security Council, which is
responsible “for advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of
homeland security” as well as serving as “the mechanism for ensuring coordination
of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and
effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.”  Chaired
by the President, the council is composed of the Vice President, the Secretaries of
Defense, Health and Human Services, and Transportation, the Attorney General, the
Director of Central Intelligence, the directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, “and such other officers of the executive branch as
the President may from time to time designate.”
A Model and Principles for Success
OHS is emerging in an environment in which several entities, having established
reputations and turf, could become rivals in some policy and administrative areas.
The situation is reminiscent of the efforts of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to create
an effective war mobilization and preparedness coordination entity.  Success was
realized with the Office of War Mobilization (OWM), established by presidential
order on May 27, 1943, and the man Roosevelt selected to direct it, James F. Byrnes,
a former member of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Supreme
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Court, and former director of the Office of Economic Stabilization.6  The OWM
mandate was sweeping and general; it was empowered:
(a) To develop programs and to establish policies for the maximum use of
the nation’s natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for
the effective use of the national manpower not in the armed forces, for the
maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy, and for the adjustment of
such economy to war needs and conditions;
(b) To unify the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in
or concerned with production, procurement, distribution or transportation of
military or civilian supplies, materials, and products and to resolve and determine
controversies between such agencies or departments, except those to be resolved
by the Director of Economic Stabilization under Section 3, Title IV of Executive
Order 9250 [concerning agricultural prices]; and
(c) To issue such directives on policy or operations to the Federal agencies
and departments as may be necessary to carry out the programs developed, the
policies established, and the decisions made under this Order.  It shall be the duty
of all such agencies and Departments to execute these directives, and to make to
the Office of War Mobilization such progress reports as may be required.
Given an office in the White House, Byrnes “soon was regarded as second only
to the President on the home front,” and, with “his frequent exhibition of confidence
in Byrnes, the President helped established public and governmental understanding
and recognition of his position.”7  OWM operated with a small staff, which Byrnes
“instructed not to constitute an isolating ‘layer between the director and the heads of
agencies [but] ... to facilitate the relations of the director with agency heads.’”  A
small staff “prevented OWM from engaging in administrative activities and
operations and from undertaking or interfering with the normal functions of other
agencies.”  It was also “inadequate to perform the type of central planning function
which many people considered OWM’s most important duty.”  However, this was
not a limitation in Byrnes’s view, for he “felt that most planning should be conducted
at agency levels and that it was his job primarily to coordinate such plans.”8  A
concise, clear understanding of OWM’s functions was offered in a July 27, 1943,
memorandum on the general plan for the operation of the agency.
The Office of War Mobilization acts for the President. ... The job of the Office
is not to perform the functions of the established departments and agencies but
to see that these functions are well performed by those charged with
responsibility for their performance.  The other primary task of the Office is to
assure coordination of separate programs, by securing policy integration,
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resolving conflicts and rendering responsible authoritative and firm decisions in
controversies.9
A few months after OWM’s creation, another presidential order expanded the
agency’s authority to include aspects of U.S. foreign economic affairs.10  As a
consequence of congressional concern about the accountability of the OWM
director’s exercise of his discretionary power, as well as a desire to begin planning
for  conversion to a peacetime economy, Congress enacted the War Mobilization and
Reconversion Act in 1944, creating the Office of War Mobilization and
Reconversion (OWMR) as an independent agency and making its presidentially
appointed director subject to Senate confirmation with a two-year term.11  This act,
by one near-contemporary estimate, was “considered the broadest grant of power ever
legislated by Congress, creating for the first time by statute a superdepartmental
director over the whole range of home-front executive activities for war and
reconversion—powers so great that some critics questioned the constitutionality of
such a grant to anyone short of the President.”12  Upon signing the legislation into
law, President Roosevelt issued an order transferring the functions and resources of
OWM to OWMR.13  Byrnes, who was named the director of the new agency,
continued to operate from the East Wing of the White House.  He left the office in
April 1945, and, three months later, was named Secretary of State.  OWMR was
dismantled at the end of 1946.14
A few years after the demise of OWMR, it was evaluated in a study as “a
notable, although improvised, attempt to equip the President with a strong staff arm
for executive policy and program coordination, as distinguished from administrative
management and fiscal control.”  The author of the study, a participant-observer who
served on the OWM-OWMR staff for 16 months, regarded the agency to be a
successful instrument of central control and coordination for the President.15  Why
was OWM-OWMR successful?  In response to this question, seven guiding
principles were offered.
Institutional Status in the President’s Office.  A presidential
coordination entity, like OWM-OWMR, “must have permanent institutional status
and must be clearly a presidential arm accountable only to him.”  It is also “essential”
that the director of such an office or “coordinator be known to have full presidential
confidence and backing.”  While it was thought that “the permanent establishment
of such an Office [as OWM-OWMR] should probably be recognized by [statutory]
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powers or be accountable to Congress.”16  Byrnes did not have “statutory powers,”
such as responsibility for administering a program, so he was not accountable to
Congress in that regard, but he did serve as a presidential liaison to Congress to
negotiate the drafting of legislation.17  He also informally kept in touch with
Members of Congress, and agreed to follow up on conflicting war programs
identified by Senator Harry S. Truman and his Senate Special Committee to
Investigate the National Defense Program,18 but avoided interceding with Congress
on behalf of individual departments, and appears to have been an infrequent witness
before congressional committees, which is reportedly why Congress made the
appointment of the OWMR director subject to Senate confirmation.
Jurisdiction Over All Agencies.  A presidential coordination entity’s span
of jurisdiction “must include all agencies and, in effect, be as broad as the
President’s,” but should “not involve curtailment of the existing policy-making
jurisdiction of any agencies.”  While the “inclusion of the military within the
coordinative jurisdiction may prove most difficult to work out,” the “problems of the
military have to be reconciled with the interests of the other agencies, and this must
be done in the President’s office,” or in the office of the coordinator acting on behalf
of the President.19
Restriction of Functions to Top Policy and Program Issues.  The
OWM-OWMR “experience demonstrated clearly that successful central coordination
must be completely divorced from any operating or administrative responsibilities.”
Indeed, when “the central unit is the capstone of an operating organization, it will
soon become just another operating agency, however important its operations may
be.”20
Non-involvement in Normal Functions of Individual Departments.
The OWM-OWMR experience suggests that the “coordinator must avoid the two-
edged evil of either allowing departments to feel that some of their normal
responsibilities—either for administration or policy-making within their regular
jurisdiction—have been taken away, or of being drawn into the innumerable detailed
problems which they may bring to him to obtain support.”  The coordinator “should
take jurisdiction only over issues not susceptible of settlement at the department level
... or where inter-agency conflict has caused an impasse.”  Similarly, he “should not
be concerned with development of methods of operation but only with seeing that





Maintenance of Reasonable Control.  Because reasonable discipline is
essential to effective coordination, in situations where “the coordinator’s authorized
decisions are flouted, he must take prompt and appropriate action either directly or,
preferably, through the President.”  Also, the coordinator “should not attempt to
eliminate all disputes among agencies, but rather to reduce their volume and
magnitude through early delineation of general policy and the provision of a locale
for final arbitration.”  As a corollary consideration, “Agencies must be given
relatively free rein for debate and for working out their differences among
themselves, within the broad framework of administration policies.”  Ultimately,
when resolving a conflict, the coordinator should “indicate that he is bringing
together all elements in the issue for the President, and assisting him in arriving at a
decision, but that the decision is the President’s.”22
Qualifications of the Program Coordinator.  Recognizing that “paper
authority and organizational lines rarely prove adequate in the higher echelons of
government,” the OWM-OWMR experience suggests that a successful coordinator
“must not only be a man [or woman] of highest ability and broad perspective, but
should possess independent position and prestige based on wide experience and
public respect.”  Those who suggest that a highly regarded individual appointed to
the coordinator position might become the President’s political competitor are
reminded that this individual is a presidential agent, whose “effectiveness can be
brought to a halt by a few public nods of disapproval from the President” because his
“office is empty of power without presidential backing.”  Indeed, the likelihood
exists that, no matter how prestigious a coordinator may be, he may become
expendable when White House decisions require a scapegoat.23
Small High-Level Staff.  The OWM-OWMR experience suggests that a
coordinator’s staff “should be small, probably not exceeding 25 persons, other than
clerical help.”  Such a staff “should all have high rank, be of recognized high caliber
and broad-gauged ‘generalists,’” and “[s]taff work requiring technical expertise
should be assigned to other units of the Executive Office or regular agencies.”  Also,
staff members “are political personnel in the high sense of the term” and “must be
willingly and patently identified with the President’s program.”  Finally, because the
coordinator “must either review or direct the actions of heads of agencies on matters
not susceptible of final determination at the departmental level, unusual caution must
be exercised regarding delegation of authority to staff members.”  However, this
consideration must be tempered by a caution against rigid adherence, so that the
coordination office does not become “an irritating bottleneck.”24
Implications for the Homeland Security Office
What implications do these principles have for the Office of Homeland Security
(OHS) as chartered by E.O. 13228?  Created by presidential directive, OHS does not
have the “permanent institutional status”of the statutorily established OWMR. A
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statutory mandate for OHS could reduce congressional reluctance to appropriate
funds to an agency subject to having its mission, responsibilities, and administration
readily modified by presidential order.  Fashioning a statutory charter for OHS would
also provide an opportunity to determine when and how the head of the agency would
be accessible to Congress.  Would this OHS leader continue to hold status as a
member of the White House Office staff, or be subject to Senate confirmation, to
appearing before appropriators to present the OHS budget, or to keeping Congress
currently and continuously informed?
It would appear that the man named to direct OHS, former Pennsylvania
Governor Tom Ridge, has the President’s confidence and backing.  He reportedly has
been allocated office space in the West Wing of the White House.  However, his
mandate to “coordinate the executive branch’s efforts” to combat terrorism, “work
with executive departments and agencies” in this regard, and “identify priorities”
concerning same does not appear to convey authority equal to that of the OWM-
OWMR director, who was empowered to “develop programs,” “establish policies,”
and “issue ... directives on policy or operations to the Federal agencies and
departments.”  Consequently, in this regard, the head of OHS, compared with the
OWM-OWMR director, may of necessity have to make more frequent resort to the
President to resolve disputes, including opposition to his initiatives.
Stated in the executive order in the most general terms, the jurisdiction of OHS
for performing its functions is not clear, and it is questionable if it, compared with
OWM-OWMR, has any jurisdiction “over” other agencies.  The executive order
establishing OHS also mandates a Homeland Security Council, chaired by the
President and composed of at least 10 members, the head of OHS being among them.
Five other officials are invited to attend council meetings, and numerous other
officials may be invited to attend council sessions “when appropriate.”  The
relationship between the functions of the head of OHS and the council is not clear.
In addition, the executive order offers no definition of the “homeland security”
concept.
The OWM-OWMR experience also warns against OHS becoming involved in
operating or administrative responsibilities.  Nonetheless, the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security is designated “the individual primarily responsible
for coordinating the domestic response efforts of all departments and agencies in the
event of an imminent terrorist threat and during and in the immediate aftermath of
a terrorist attack within the United States.”  Such activity not only suggests the
exercise of operating or administrative authority, but also a duplication of, or
intrusion into, the responsibilities of the director of FEMA.
A former member of the House of Representatives and a popular governor,
Ridge is generally thought to be a qualified appointee to head OHS.  Early press
accounts indicated that OHS might initially have a staff of 100, four times the
number suggested by the OWM-OWMR experience.  Most of these, at least initially,
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would be detailees—civil servants, not “political personnel”—from agencies within
the jurisdiction of OHS.25
Finally, apart from the OWM-OWMR experience, some have argued that  OHS
should have some authority over the budgets of agencies responsible for combating
terrorism or homeland security.26  One model is provided in the case of the director
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), a coordinator, who, in
conjunction with preparing a national drug control strategy, prepares a consolidated
national drug control program budget to implement the strategy.  The ONDCP
director certifies the adequacy of agency drug control program budgets.  In cases
where a budget is deemed inadequate, the ONDCP director recommends a new
funding level.  These recommendations are considered during the preparation of the
President’s annual budget.  Also, no national drug control program agency may
submit to Congress a reprogramming or transfer request for any  appropriated funds
greater than $5 million in the national drug control program budget unless the request
has been approved by the ONDCP director.  In the event of a disapproval, the agency
may appeal the ONDCP director’s decision to the President.27
E.O. 13228 authorizes the head of OHS to review agency budgets and make
recommendations to agency heads and to the director of the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) regarding the levels and uses of funding for homeland security-
related activities.  Prior to the forwarding of the proposed annual budget submission
to the President for transmittal to Congress, the head of OHS is to certify to the OMB
director the funding levels that he “believes are necessary and appropriate for the
homeland security-related activities of the executive branch.”  No further guidance
in this regard is offered by the order.
Administrative Developments
Prior to Ridge’s October 8, 2001, appointment as Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security, President Bush, as he indicated in an October 5 letter to the
Speaker of the House, authorized the transfer of $195.9 million from the emergency
response fund established by statute (115 Stat. 220) for recovery from, and response
to, the September 11 terrorist attacks, $25.5 million of which was allocated for the
establishment of OHS.28 
Ridge launched OHS operations in early October with a dozen staff assistants.
By October 18, when he held his first press conference, he had added a couple of
individuals to his staff, and indicated that he talked at least once daily with the
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President and did so, as well, with key Cabinet officials and the director of the FBI.
He described himself, as a coordinator, as being like an orchestra conductor.29  “The
music doesn’t start playing,” he said, “until he taps the baton.”  When agencies
respond to terrorist activity, “my role would be to participate in that effort to make
sure that the response—agency-wide, cross-government-wide—is coordinated so that
it is quick and is aggressive and is [as] complete as possible.  That’s my job,” he
proffered.  He also indicated that his role was that of an overseer: “[I]f there is a gap,
if there is something I think that needs to be done differently, if there are additional
preventive measures I think need to be taken, if I think we have overlooked
something, I make the call.”  He added, however, in response to a question, that he
did not have tactical or operational authority.
What President Bush asked me to do was [to] come to Washington to work to
create a comprehensive national plan, to deal with homeland security ... and to
do whatever I could in conjunction, in consultation—and yes, I have the
authority—I certainly have access.  I have the President’s ear.  But my job is
really long-term.
... The President has tasked me to take a look at the 46-plus agencies, to take a
look at everything that everybody considers to be homeland security, and over
the next several months [to] put together a comprehensive national strategy to
deal with this ... threat that perhaps we thought about, but really didn’t think too
long or hard about.
Concluding his remarks on his role, Ridge said: “I’m the one person in the
government that can stand back from the different agencies, stand back from their
missions, and stand back from their history and say, ‘Well, Mr. President, I would
recommend that we strengthen our national ability to respond to these threats with
this strategy.’  That I have been asked to do, and that’s what I’ll do.”
Later, in his October 25 remarks to the U.S. Conference of Mayors Summit,
Ridge commented that he was “very open-minded to the notion that once I get done
doing my work and present a national strategy to the President, that the realignment
of some of those agencies [having something to do with homeland security] may be
an outcome.  I can’t tell you which one[s],” he quickly added, “but my challenge is
to give the President a national strategy based on what I learned from you and
everybody else.  And so, I may just do that.”  Government organization for homeland
security arose again at Ridge’s November 27 press briefing, where he said that “one
of the challenges that the Office of Homeland Security has is to make sure that it
becomes a permanent part of how the federal government does business.”  Regarding
the federal agencies having a role in maintaining homeland security, Ridge
commented that “we will have to take a look at whether or not we will enhance
security if we merge their functions.”  In late December, aides to Ridge reportedly
produced a tempest within the Bush Administration when they unveiled a broad
proposal to create an agency that would consolidate border security management.
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Opponents represented a wide range of agencies, including five Cabinet
departments.30
Returning to the October 18 press briefing, Ridge, responding to a question
about his being included in the national security and intelligence briefings given daily
to the President and his aides, said: “I am cleared by the President to have as much
information as I want or need, which means that I have access to that kind of
information.”  Asked if he would be “the spokesman—the main person who will
interface with the public” regarding administration efforts to effect homeland
security, Ridge said “yes,” and indicated that there were plans “to try to have more
regular briefings of this type.”  Indeed, he subsequently held nine such briefings
during the year, in addition to some speeches he also offered during the period.  This
activity prompted some to question whether he would be “an effective overseer or
another spinner.”31
At his October 19 press briefing, Ridge announced the creation of the Homeland
Security Support Team at FEMA to gather information concerning consequence
management for OHS and help state and local government officials with access to
such information.  By the end of the month, the task force reportedly consisted of
eight staff members, with others to be added, drawn from several agencies.32
On occasion, Ridge has directly intervened in homeland security administration.
At his October 19 press briefing, Ridge revealed that, at the request of New York
Governor George Pataki, he had obtained an extension of the stay of a Coast Guard
cutter protecting the greater New York harbor area.  Ridge reportedly acted on behalf
of South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges to ensure that there would be no plutonium
deliveries to a Savannah River nuclear power plant until a security and storage
dispute was resolved.  Similarly, he assisted Michigan Governor John Engler, who
was having difficulties in his efforts to keep National Guard troops on duty to help
customs agents clear the way for goods and workers to cross the bridges from
Canada.  Ridge also shifted money in the budget to enable the Postal Service to
quickly purchase equipment to irradiate mail that might contain anthrax spores.33
The Homeland Security Council held its initial meeting on October 29.  That
same day, the President inaugurated the issuance of Homeland Security Presidential
Directives (HSPDs) “that shall record and communicate presidential decisions about
the homeland security policies of the United States.”  Additional details about the
issuance of HSPDs were not immediately available, but they apparently are not being
published in the Federal Register.  The initial directive concerned the organization
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and operation of the Homeland Security Council; the second, also issued on October
29, pertained to combating terrorism through immigration policies; the third, issued
March 11, 2002, established the Homeland Security Advisory System of five
graduated threat conditions to apprise the executive branch and the nation of the risk
of a terrorist attack.
Ridge also named six senior members of his OHS team on October 29.  They
included:
! Steve Abbot, a retired Navy admiral, former deputy commander in chief of the
United States European Command during the recent Kosovo conflict, and
executive director of a national preparedness review group for Vice President
Richard B. Cheney, to be the OHS deputy director;
! Mark A. Holman, an attorney, former administrative assistant and chief of
staff to then-Representative Ridge, and former chief of staff to then-Governor
Ridge, to be an assistant to the OHS deputy director;
! Becky Halkias, former deputy chief of staff for federal affairs in then-
Governor Ridge’s Washington office, to be the OHS liaison to Congress; she
subsequently left her OHS position in early April 2002;34
! Carl M. Buchholz, an attorney and former special assistant to the late Senator
John Heinz, to be the OHS executive secretary;
! Barbara Chaffee, a former senior assistant to then-Governor Ridge, to be the
OHS public liaison; and
! Susan Neely, a communications professional, former press secretary and
communications director for then-Governor Terry Branstad of Iowa, and
former senior vice president for communications of the Association of
American Medical Colleges, to be the OHS communications director and
senior media representative.35
By mid-December, as the internal organization of OHS was taking shape, plans
called for a staff of 186 personnel, 170 of whom were anticipated to be assigned
temporarily from a range of agencies.  OHS Deputy Director Abbot was responsible
for supervising two program clusters, one composed of directorates on programs and
budget as well as policy and plans and another including directorates on research and
development, protection and prevention, response and recovery, and intelligence and
detection.  OHS Deputy Assistant Holman was heading a cluster counting
directorates on public liaison, intergovernmental affairs, and communication.  An
administration and support directorate, as well as the OHS coordination center, were
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supervised by OHS Executive Secretary Buchholz.36  Located in a former naval
communications complex off Ward Circle in Washington, DC, the OHS coordination
center was unveiled in early May 2002 and was scheduled to become operational
within the next few weeks.37  Earlier, with E.O. 13260 of March 19, 2002, President
Bush established the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council with four
Senior Advisory Committees to assist it, members being drawn from state and local
government, academia and the policy research community, the private sector, and
emergency services, law enforcement, and public health organizations and
hospitals.38
By late January 2002, Ridge was reportedly “facing resistance to some of his
ideas, forcing him to apply the brakes on key elements of his agenda and raising
question about how much he can accomplish.”  Among the OHS plans engendering
opposition from within the executive branch included those to streamline or
consolidate agencies responsible for border security; improve intelligence
distribution to federal, state, and local agencies; and alert federal, state, and local
officials of terrorist threats using a system of graduated levels of danger.  It was noted
that, “even though he works a few steps from the Oval Office, Ridge has been left out
of important intelligence discussions” concerning homeland security.  For example,
“he is not included in a more expansive intelligence briefing provided daily to the
president, the vice president, the White House chief of staff and several others,” and
Ridge also acknowledged that he was unaware of the details of late November
meetings in Pakistan by the Director of Central Intelligence.39
At about this same time, Ridge began to become embroiled in controversy over
his refusal to testify before congressional committees.  Among the first to request his
appearance were Senator Robert C. Byrd and Senator Ted Stevens, respectively, the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations.  Ridge
turned down their initial, informal invitation and later formal requests of March 15
and April 4.40  When Ridge declined the request of Representative Ernest Istook, Jr.,
chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service,
and General Government, appropriations for the Executive Office of the President
were threatened, prompting Ridge to offer to meet with Istook and other
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subcommittee members in an informal session.41  Thereafter, Ridge arranged other
informal briefings with members of the House Committee on Government Reform
and a group of Senators, and agreed to a similar such session with members of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce.  These informal meetings did not
appear to abate the controversy that Ridge’s refusals to testify had generated.42
Assessing the situation in early May, a New York Times news analysis proffered
that, “instead of becoming the preeminent leader of domestic security, Tom Ridge
has become a White House adviser with a shrinking mandate, forbidden by the
president to testify before Congress to explain his strategy, overruled in White House
councils and overshadowed by powerful cabinet members reluctant to cede their turf
or their share of the limelight.”  In support of this view, the analysis noted that the
Pentagon did not consult with Ridge when suspending air patrols over New York
City—a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense explained this action by saying,
“We don’t tell the Office of Homeland Security about recommendations, only about
decisions”—and the Attorney General unilaterally announced a possible terrorist
threat against banks last month.43  Asked about this assessment by Jim Lehrer on the
PBS Newshour, Ridge called it “false” and said, “I just don’t think they have spent
enough time with me on a day-to-day basis.”44  Shortly thereafter, a New York Times
editorial observed that one of the reasons Ridge “lost these turf battles is that he
failed to build a constituency for change in Congress.  His refusal to testify before
Congressional committees has not helped.”45  Others—Senator Bob Graham and
Brookings scholar Paul Light, former Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowney, and
former White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta—have contended that Ridge needs
“tools” or direct authority to do his job effectively.46
CRS-14
47Elizabeth Becker, “Domestic Security: Bush is Said to Consider a New Security
Department,” New York Times, Apr. 12, 2002, p. A15.
Ridge’s problems had not escaped White House attention.  In his April 11, 2002,
testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs concerning Senator
Lieberman’s proposal for a homeland security department, Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.,
the director of the Office of Management and Budget, indicated that the President
might eventually decide to create the department as envisaged in the Lieberman bill.
In addition, Daniels said he would consider creating a working group with Senator
Lieberman to discuss the legislation.47  Subsequently, Daniels, Ridge, White House
Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Jr., and White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales
would constitute the principal members of a secret group that would begin drafting
the President’s departmental plan on April 23.  This proposal was unveiled on June
6.  The President’s surprise announcement was viewed not only as an attempt to
regain the initiative in the nation’s efforts at combating terrorism, but also to move
beyond the coordination efforts of the Office of Homeland Security to a strong
administrative structure for managing consolidated programs concerned with border
security and effective response to domestic terrorism incidents.  An alternative model
is provided by Senator Lieberman (S. 2452) and Representative Mac Thornberry
(H.R. 4660), creating both a Department of National Homeland Security and a new
Executive Office of the President entity, the National Office for Combating
Terrorism.
Legislation
Bills currently pending before the 107th Congress providing an alternative model
to the OHS established by the President include the following measures.
H.R. 525 (Gilcrest)/S. 1453 (Smith).  The Preparedness Against Domestic
Terrorism Act of 2001 amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act to provide for improved federal efforts to prepare for and respond to
terrorist attacks, and for other purposes, including the establishment of the
President’s Council on Domestic Preparedness.  Introduced in the House on Feb. 8,
2001, and referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; referred
to the Subcommittee on Economic Development Feb. 9; subcommittee hearings held
Apr. 24 and May 9; subcommittee mark-up session Sept. 20; referred, as amended,
to the full committee Sept. 20; committee consideration, markup, and order to be
reported Nov. 7.  Introduced in the Senate on Sept. 21, 2001, and referred to the
Committee on Environment and Public Works.
H.R. 1158 (Thornberry).  The National Homeland Security Agency Act
establishes a National Homeland Security Agency  as an independent agency with a
director appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation.  Introduced
March 21, 2001, and referred to the Committee on Government Reform; referred to
the Subcommittee on National Security Apr. 23; subcommittee joint hearing held
Apr. 24.
H.R. 1292 (Skelton).  The Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001 requires
the President to develop and implement a strategy for homeland security, including
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designating a single government official responsible for homeland security.
Introduced March 29, 2001, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services with
additional referral to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the
Judiciary, and Intelligence; Transportation Subcommittee on Economic Development
joint hearing held Apr. 24.
H.R. 3026 (Gibbons).  The Office of Homeland Security Act of 2001
establishes an Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the
President with a director appointed by the President and subject to Senate
confirmation, who is responsible, among other duties, for the creation of a national
strategy and a national budget for homeland security, as well as developing a
comprehensive national assessment of the threat to homeland security, and
coordinating the planning and implementation of federal activities regarding same.
Introduced Oct. 4, 2001, and referred to the Committee on Government Reform with
additional referral to the Committee on Armed Services, the Judiciary, Transportation
and Infrastructure, Intelligence, and Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 5005 (Armey) (by request).  Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Establishes a Department of Homeland Security.  Introduced June 24, 2002, and
referred to the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and, in addition, to the
Committees on Agriculture, Appropriations, Armed Services, Energy and
Commerce, Financial Services, Government Reform, Intelligence, International
Relations, the Judiciary, Science, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Ways and
Means.
S. 1449 (Graham).  Establishes a National Office for Combating Terrorism
within the Executive Office of the President with a director appointed by the
President and subject to Senate confirmation.  Introduced Sept. 21, 2001, and referred
to the Committee on Governmental Affairs; hearing held Oct. 12.
S. 1534 (Lieberman).  Establishes a Department of National Homeland
Security.  Introduced Oct. 12, 2001, and referred to the Committee on Governmental
Affairs; hearing held Oct. 12.
S. 2452 (Lieberman)/H.R. 4660 (Thornberry).  Establishes a Department
of National Homeland Security and a National Office for Combating Terrorism
within the Executive Office of the President.  Introduced May 2, 2002, and referred
in the Senate to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, and in the House to the
Committee on Government Reform.  Ordered to be reported (S.Rept. 107-175) on a
7-3 vote in the Senate on May 22.
